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Sociology and Sociological
Jurisprudence: Admixture of Lore
and Law
By GiLBERT GEmS*
The life history to date of sociological jurisprudence as a
school of legal thought provides much instructive material con-
cerning broader intellectual developments both within the law
and within sociology in the United States. The jurisprudential
elements in the school have remained relatively intact, though
they have been considerably refined since their initial statement
by Roscoe Pound in the first decade of the century,' and in legal
circles the theory is still generally regarded as "the most popular
movement in jurisprudence in the United States."2 Meanwhile,
the domestic sociological components of the theory, drawn largely
from the contemporaneous work of Edward A. Ross and Albion
W. Small, have passed through several stages, ranging from their
preeminent position within the main body of sociological thought
at the time of their emergence to their almost total dismissal and
intellectual exile today.
Certainly some of the disparate success of the elements of
sociological jurisprudence in the relevant academic disciplines
* Professor of Sociology, Los Angeles State College.
1 Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607 (1907);
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 Harv. L. Rev.
591 (1911). 25 Harv. L. Rev. 140, 489 (1911-12). "Sociological jurisprudence"
will be used here to refer exclusively to the positions taken by Pound since the
school is singularly his own, despite the excellent later contributions of scholars
such as Stone and Simpson. Pound tacitly acknowledges this situation, writing for
instance about "the task laid down in the programme of American sociological
jurisprudence" and then citing his own statements on the goals of his own school.
Pound SociologV of Law and Sociological Jurisprudence, 5 U. Toronto L.J. 1, 5
(1943). Pounds writings can be traced through the bibliographic listings in
Setaro, A Bibliography of the Writings of Roscoe Pound (1942), and Strait, A
Bibliography of the Writings of Roscoe Pound, 1940-1960 (1960). The best
secondary source is Reuschlein, Jurisprudence-Its American Prophets 103-154
(1951).
2 Hall, Progress of American Jurisprudence, The Administration of Justice in
Retrospect 24, 29 (Harding ed. 1957).
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can be traced to largely fortuitous circumstances. The vigorous
longevity of Dean Pound has enabled him to defend and to
expand his original ideas well beyond the period when his con-
temporaries had passed from the scene. Pound could, for ex-
ample, revise his original "theory of interests," first stated in 1914,
during the twenties, again in 1943, and yet again in the recent
publication of his five-volume treatise on jurisprudence.' But
productive scholarship over an unusually long period of time is
hardly a total explanation of the endurance of sociological juris-
prudence, for too many scholars have survived long enough to
watch helplessly as their contributions passed into senescence.
A further explanation of the durability of sociological juris-
prudence may be sought in the nature of the law and legal
thinking in general. The law, it has often been noted, changes
rather slowly compared to other segments of a society's ideational
culture. This relative rigidity may partly be traced to the
articulation and codification of the law-visible and written things
tend to have a certain endemic inertia in contrast to more
intangible items. It is a professional tradition in the law, from
which sociological jurisprudence has undoubtedly benefited, to
build upon existing structures where possible, refining and
redefining them, rather than to discard such material and strike
out along a totally novel path. Much agility is often shown and
admired in legal writings which are able to break fresh ground
while at the same time they incorporate at least some elements
of time-honored and consecrated traditions.4
The chronological age of law and sociology at the time they
coalesced to form sociological jurisprudence also likely con-
tributed to the divergent intellectual fates of the elements of the
theory. Legal scholarship had already preempted a not incon-
siderable number of jurisprudential avenues of inquiry: analytical,
8 See Pound, Outlines of Lectures in Jurisprudence 56-59 (2d ed. 1914);
Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 Proc. Amer. Soc. Soc'y 16 (1921); Pound,
A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1943); 3 Pound, Jurisprudence
3-376 (1959).
4 Note, in this connection: "The opposition to sociological jurisprudence has
always been loyal opposition." Cowan, A Report on the Status of the Philosophy
of Law in the United States, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 1086, 1094 (1950), and: "It is
some indication of the weight and influence of Pound's philosophy that there has
been relatively little criticism of his approach, and such criticism has generally
been directed toward complementing it rather than supplanting it." Braybrooke,
The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, 5 U. W. Austl. Ann. L. Rev.
288, 309 (1961).
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historical, metaphysical, and philosophical jurisprudence in many
intricate forms had all been explored for some time. Sociology,
on the other band, was barely emerging in the first decade of this
century, and it was presented with boundless opportunities and
few guides for the establishment of a coherent body of principles
and procedures for the determination of the realms into which it
would advance with its specialized viewpoint for the observation
and description of human behavior.
The early sociological professors and writers, like the roster
of a newly-formed major league baseball team, were gathered
together from a conglomerate diversity of sources. None of them,
of course, had been trained in the field in which he was working;
primarily their backgrounds were in theology, economics, history,
or political science.5 Both the sociological pioneers and the legal
philosophers of their time shared an interest in and an under-
standing of classical and continental speculative writers, and this
common background provided an important foundation onto
which they could add an amalgamated and mutually compre-
hensible theory of jurisprudence.
Subsequently, as sociology strove to gain an identity of its own
in the United States, its interests tended to become more paro-
chial. During this period, which extends from a rather hazy
beginning in the mid-1920's to, with some notable recent abate-
ment, the present moment, sociology abandoned its reliance on
European traditions and sources, with the exception of the works
of theorists such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Instead, it
concentrated upon the establishment of a hard core of intramural
consensus in regard to a disciplinary ethos. In this period,
American sociology became, without question, the world leader
in the arena it chose for its own and carried with it, though well
behind, an emerging continental movement which now sought
to divorce the social science of sociology from the social philo-
sophical tradition that held sway. In the process of acquiring
direction and definition of its meaning and methods, American
sociology retreated from its involvement with the law, which at
best had been only a transient and relatively passive affiliation on
its part. Sociology also divorced itself to a great extent from
5 Cf. Bernard & Bernard, Origins of American Sociology 33-55 (1943); Odum,
American Sociology (1951).
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economics and political science and turned the major share of its
extra-mural attention to the study of psychology and anthro-
pology, with emergent kinship aggressions and an ensuing gain
to the three disciplines at the price of more relentless inquiry into
the major institutional patterns of the society. Legal scholars
during this period, for their part, no longer crossed the bridge
that Pound had so brilliantly constructed between their field and
sociology, largely because the distance seemed too far, the toll too
steep, and the grass on the other side not particularly verdant.
Several continentally-trained writers (to keep the metaphor
momentarily alive) tried to swim the interdisciplinary channel,
but their training in an alien branch of jurisprudence was either
too far afield to be attractive to American legal scholars or their
sociology was too foreign to make any real impact on the
American variety.
Tentative gestures by sociology in recent years toward areas
of inquiry, including law, which were neglected during the
period of definition and consolidation can be clearly distin-
guished. Explanations for this development are more difficult
to come by than evidences of its appearance. It may represent
partially a return to the doctrine of intellectual supremacy that
was enunciated by Auguste Comte in what are considered to be
the founding statements of sociology, and it may represent as well
the necessity to occupy talents that without expansion of the
subject matter beyond usual limits would be supernumerary in a
field acquiring recruits as rapidly as sociology. The condition of
our civilization today, with the apparent pressing need for
formal international control and order, most certainly also needs
to be included in any attempt at understanding sociology's
nascent return to consideration of legal matters, for all intel-
lectual trends have roots, be they tap or feeder, in the climate of
the times.
The task of the present paper will be to explore the relation-
ship between sociology and law in the United States as this
relationship first bore fruit in the ideas brought together by Pound
as "sociological jurisprudence." Efforts will be made to trace in
greater detail the three phases in the relationship described
earlier: first, the period embracing the birth of sociological
jurisprudence and coinciding with the infancy of sociology;
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second, the period involving the refinement of sociological juris-
prudence by legal scholars and the virtual abandonment of legal
inquiry by sociology; and third, the period embracing the grow-
ing interaction between law and sociology. Finally, a brief
attempt will be made to indicate the likely implications of
historical and current developments in jurisprudence and in
sociology for the theory of sociological jurisprudence and for
studies grouped as part of what is known as the sociology of law.
I. RosCoE PouND AN nm SocIoLoGIsTs
Edward A. Ross joined the faculty of the University of
Nebraska in 1901 after resigning from Stanford University fol-
lowing a fierce battle for academic freedom and his personal
right to espouse controversial political issues such as "free silver"
in the face of the opposition of Leland Stanford's widow.6 Roscoe
Pound, at thirty-one, four years younger than Ross, was appointed
that same year as one of nine commissioners of the supreme court
in Nebraska in a move aimed at expediting overripe judicial
business. Pound, despite his court work, continued to teach law
at the university each morning.7
Ross had many qualities that stood ready to attract Pound's
attention. Besides being physically prepossessing (Ross stood six
feet six inches tall and weighed more than 250 pounds), he
emanated friendly self-possession and an almost evangelical
fervor to communicate the vital messages he believed were
contained in the newly-emergent study of sociology, a field which,
as he would shortly write with typical verve, "does not meekly
sidle in among the established sciences dealing with the various '
aspects of social life,"8 but ". . . aspires to nothing less than
suzerainty."9 "Ross was always a person whom one held in
awe,"'1 a former student recalled, and "to have been associated
with [him] was a supremely choice life experience." 1 As late as
6 EUitt, Stanford University: the First Twenty-Five Years 826-368 (1937).
7 Sayre, The Life of Roscoe Pound 102 (1948). Pound deserves a better
biography than this rambling, fumbling account. Cf. Simpson, Roscoe Pound and
Interpretations of Modem Legal Philosophies, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 393, 404-7
(1948).
8 Ross, Foundations of Sociology 8 (1905).
9 Id. at 8-9.
10 Hertzler, Edward Alsworth Ross, 16 Amer. Soc. Rev. 598 (1951).
11 Id. at 599. See also Gillin, The Personality of Edward Alsworth Ross, 42
Amer. J. Soc. 534 (1957).
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1948, Ross could still be described as "the most dramatic and
effective classroom teacher in the history of American soci-
ology."
12
Ross had studied philosophy in Germany after receiving his
bachelor's degree in 1886, and then had attended Johns Hop-
kins University for his doctorate, specializing in economics and
finance, philosophy and ethics, and comparative jurisprudence.
After searching his mind for ideas concerning "the linch-pins
which hold society together,"1 he had by 1894 conceived the
plan of intensively delineating systems of "social control."14 In
concentrating on the implications of the postulate that all groups
and institutions constantly exert manifold pressures upon their
units, Ross felt that he had "stumbled on to a great social
secret."15
Social Control, published in 1901, became one of the classics
of early American sociology. The book represents an elaborate
inventory of the methods by which a society induces conformity
into human behavior, written in a highly pungent style and
illustrated with numerous anecdotes collected during Ross' exten-
sive travels. Considerable attention is paid to the role of public
opinion and law as the two most important means of controlling
individuals. Public opinion, Ross notes, may be aligned with
morality, sensitive to the moment, and flexible enough to control
actions even before they occur, but its weakness lies in its
fitfulness. Law, with its "blade... playing up and down in its
groove with iron precision," 6 is considered by Ross to be "the
most specialized and highly finished engine of control employed
by society."' 7 But, like most sociologists, Ross denegated the
influence of law when weighed in the balance against public
1
2 Kolb, The Sociological Theories of Edward Alsworth Ross, Introduction to
the History of Sociology 819, 820 (Barnes ed. 1948).
13 Ross, Seventy Years of It 56 (1936).
14 The idea of social control bad been employed, though without any
prominence, by Spencer, 2 Principles of Sociology 216-230 (1900 ed.), and Ross
is invariably credited with introducing the term into general sociological use. Cf.
Gurvitch, Social Control, Twentieth Century Sociology 267 (Gurvitch & Moore
ed. 1945). Pound of course incorporated the concept into his sociological juris-
prudence and employed it in the title of Social Control Through Law (1942).
15 Stem, The Ward-Ross Correspondence, 1891-1896, 3 Amer. Soc. Rev. 362,
392 (1938).
16 Ross, Social Control 94 (1901).
17 Id. at 106.
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opinion, finding law "hardly so good a regulative instrument as
the flexible lash of public censure."I'
The personal relations of Ross and Pound are summarized by
Ross in a brief paragraph in his autobiography; the importance
of these relations for the content of sociological jurisprudence is
documented throughout the writings of Pound. 9 It is important
to realize that Pound, for his part, had no discernible impact on
the intellectual orientation or production of Ross,20 indicating
the early establishment of a one-way route that would continue
to regulate traffic between sociology and sociological jurispru-
dence. Both Ross and Pound were members of a "congenial"
group, known apparently merely as the "Ten," who dined
together once a month. "I did not imagine that I was 'making a
dent' on [Pound]," Ross wrote much later, "but quietly he began
to acquaint himself with the sociological view of law and courts.
... In 1906 he wrote me, 'I believe you have set me in the path
the world is moving in."' 2'
Part of Ross' influence was undoubtedly in the direction of
forcefully advocating to Pound the views of his uncle-by-mar-
riage, Lester F. Ward, the man to whom Ross dedicated Social
Control. Ward was later, in 1906-1907, the first president of the
American Sociological Society, and is often considered "the father
of American sociology." Ward was by profession a government
geologist and paleobotanist, a background compatible with
Pound's pre-legal concentration in botany,22 and one which mast
have made Ward's works especially attractive to Pound since
they quite often drew upon the earth and plant sciences for
analogy and vocabulary to describe social processes.
18 Id. at 94.
19 Pound has clearly stated the debt: "I.. .passed... under the influence
of Ross and Small to sociological jurisprudence." Pound, Sociology of Law,
Twentieth Century Sociology 297, 336 (Gurvitch & Moore ed. 1945).20 Years later, Ross did strenuously push Pound for the presidency of the
University of Wisconsin and in a footnote to the story of jurisprudence tells
briefly how Felix Frankfurter spent an evening trying to talk him out of his
advocacy, insisting that Pound, unable to delegate authority, was by nature a
scholar rather than an administrator. Ross, Seventy Years of It 297-8 (1936).
Ross dedicated his Principles of Sociology to Pound, a gesture which led
newspapers to denounce Pound as the leader of the sociological (read "socialistic")movement in the nation's law schools. Ross, Seventy Years of It 303-4 (1936); of.
Sayre, the Life of Roscoe Pound 275 
(1948).
21 Ross, Seventy Years of It 89 (1936).
22 See Walter, The Legal Ecology of Roscoe Pound, 4 Miami L.Q. 178
(1950).
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Ward, like Ross, was a combination crusader and arm-chair
analyst, maintaining a certain posture of disengagement in his
work, yet insisting that its utility for improving social arrange-
ments was one of its essential ingredients. Society, Ward be-
lieved,
should not drift aimlessly to and fro, backwards and forwards,
without guidance. Rather, the group should carefully study its
situations, comprehend the aims it desires to accomplish, study
scientifically the best methods for the attainment of these, and
then concentrate social energy to the task set before it.23
Pound has credited Ward's influence on sociological juris-
prudence as lying primarily in the turning of sociology in the
United States from biology toward psychology. 4 The biology
was essentially the mechanical view espoused by Herbert Spen-
cer, who saw law as an instrument of little import in a process of
social evolution based on Darwinian principles.2 5 Though Ward
never totally repudiated these views, he placed great emphasis
on the possibility of intervening in the process of social evolution
and undercutting its general inelasticity. Ward made a basic
distinction, for instance, between pure sociology, a theoretical
undertaking seeking to establish the principles of the science,
and applied sociology, which "deals with artificial means of
accelerating spontaneous processes of nature."26 Like Ross and
other early sociologists, Ward saw much value in his views for
the legal process and for lawmen. Legislators, Ward believed,
should be trained sociologists so that sociological principles
could be employed in behalf of social reform. Ward conceded
that legislatures would probably have to be maintained, but he
thought that "more and they will become a merely formal way
of putting the final sanction of society on decisions that have been
worked out in the... sociological laboratory. 27 The problem of
ethics for Ward revolved around means to reduce friction in social
23 Dealey, Lester Frank Ward, American Masters of Social Science 61, 82
(Odun ed. 1927). Ross put it more bluntly for himself and his mentor: "Suckled
on the practicalism of Lester F. Ward, I wouldn't give a snap of my finger for the
"pussyfooting' sociologist." Ross, Seventy Years of It 180 (1936).24 Pound, supra note 19, at 306.
25 See Cairns, Law and the Social Sciences 136-141 (1935).26 Ward, Pure Sociology 3, 431 (1903).2
7 Ward, Applied Sociology 338-9 (1906). See also Fleming, The Role of
Government in a Free Society: The Conception of Lester Frank Ward, 24 Social
Forces 237 (1946).
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action,28 a view closely paralleling Pound's emphasis on the end
of law as "a continually more complete and effective elimination
of waste and precluding of friction in human enjoyment of goods
of existence .... "2 9
The third pioneering American sociologist whose views made
considerable imprint on Pound was Albion W. Small who,
in the compact world of the early sociologists, was a regular
correspondent of both Ward and Ross. Small's training had been
in philosophy and theology, and he was highly conversant with
the writings of the European scholars who formed such important
sources for much of Pound's work. Small too was a firm believer
in social engineering; sociology for him had its raison d'etre in its
potential service as a guide to a scientific program of social
reform.
Small was also concerned, well before Pound was writing in
this vein, with the classification and analysis of human interests
as a step in the process of social melioration. Interests were seen
as the universal human proclivity and approached with an almost
biblical tone. "In the beginning," wrote Professor Small, "were
interests."30 An interest was defined as an unsatisfied capacity,
an unrealized condition of the organism, a tendency to secure
satisfaction of an unsatisfied capacity. In its subjective phase an
interest was a desire, and in its objective phase a want, developed
when the individual knew something, felt something, or willed
something. Therefore, the entire individual or social process con-
sisted in developing, adjusting, and satisfying interests. 3' These
interests were designated in six categories: 1) health, sub-
sunming under it food, sex, and work; 2) wealth; 3) sociability;
4) knowledge; 5) beauty; and 6) rightness.32 Each interest for
Small tended to be absolute and to seek satisfaction regardless
of others, and the social process resolved itself into a continual
formation of groups and institutions around interests, with social
life becoming a perpetual equating and adjusting of interests.
33
Small's conception of the State is noteworthy as well in terms
2 8 Stem, The Ward-Ross Correspondence, 1891-1906, 3 Amer. Soc. Rev. 362,
369 (1938).2 9 Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 99 (1942).
3D Small, General Sociology 196 (1905).
31 Id. at 433-4.
32 Ibid.
33 Id. at 217.
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of Pound's later enunciation of the ideas and elements of
sociological jurisprudence:
Civil society organized as the State is composed of indi-
vidual and group factors, each of which has in itself . . .
interests seemingly distinct from the interests of others. Each
has some degree of impulse to assert these interests in spite
of the others. Thus the State is a union of disunions, a con-
ciliation of conflicts, a harmony of discords. The State is an
arrangement of combinations by which mutually repellent
forces are brought into some measure of concurrent action.34
Like Ward, Small believed that sociology was ideally suited to
adjudicating amongst the varied interests impinging one upon
another by bringing to bear its scientific insights, and he at-
tempted to blend his concern with both science and social reform
by the following ingenious method of choosing among social
values: "The most reliable criterion of human values which
science can propose," Small wrote, "would be the consensus of
councils of scientists representing the largest possible variety of
human interest, and co-operating to reduce their special judg-
ments to a scale which would render their due to each of the
interests of the total calculation." 35
II. HOLXMS AM TIM SocIoLoGIsTs
It is important for the historical tracing of the interaction of
law and sociology to note that Ward, Small, and Ross did not
appeal solely to Roscoe Pound as a lonely venturer into an
adjacent and novel academic discipline. Pound distilled and
adjusted these early sociological writings into his conception of
sociological jurisprudence, and it is unlikely that such a wide
diffusion of the ideas would have taken place without Pound's
initiative. But that the times were agreeable to such an enterprise
can be clearly seen from the hearing given to each of the soci-
ologists by legal figures of the time such as Justice Holmes.
Ross's Social Control had been recommended to Justice Holmes
in 1906 by Professor Ely of the University of Wisconsin, who was
341d. at 252-3.
35 Small, The Meaning of Social Science 242 (1910). See also Bogardus, The
Development of Social Thought 305 (4th ed. 1960); Barnes, Albion Woodbury
Small, Introduction to the History of Sociology 766 (Barnes ed. 1948); Hayes,
Albion Woodbury Small, American Masters of Social Science 149 (Odum ed.
1927); Goodspeed, Albion Woodbury Small, 32 Amer. J. Soc. 1 (1926).
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responsible for bringing Ross to Wisconsin that year. Holmes
read Social Control and, in typical fashion, also obtained Ross'
Foundations of Sociology, read that, and, in equally typical
fashion, felt impelled to communicate his considerable enthusiasm
to the author of the books,' 6 as well as to the President of the
United States. Theodore Roosevelt, in his turn, also apparently
read the books and certainly conveyed his appreciation of them
to Ross.37 Twenty years later, Holmes was still recommending
Ross' work, now to Harold Laski, who reported that he shared
the Justice's "keeness" about the volumes, though he felt the
"style is an insult to God,"" a view from which Holmes explicitly
dissented.39
The exposure of Justice Holmes to the work of Small sheds
much light on the disenchantment which both he and Laski, and
presumably other influential members of the scholarly element
in the legal profession, came to feel with sociological work
clothed in wrapping more forbidding than Ross' attractive prose.
Holmes took up Smalrs Meaning of Social Science in 1919 after
hearing that Small was "Pound's great man."40 He found Small
unoriginal, that "he did not pretend to be saying new things in
this book and wasn't."41 Within a month, Small's book remained
to Holmes "but a faint perfume in my mind."42 Laski used
Holmes' comment on Small as a springboard for a stinging
critique both of Small and of Pound himself that merits repetition
as an indication of the obstacles that sociological jurisprudence
faced in its home discipline:
Pound's Albion Small seems to me to represent exactly the
worse side of Pound. Small belongs to that pedantocracy who
36 Holmes wrote that the books were
so civilized, so enlightened by side knowledge, often indicated by a
single key word, so skeptical yet so appreciative even of illusion, so
abundant in insight, and often so crowded with felicities, that it makes
me happy to think that they come from America and not from Europe.
They hit me where I live...
Letter from Holmes to Ross, May 6, 1906, in Ross, Seventy Years of It 99 (1936).
3T Letter from Roosevelt to Ross, June 15, 1906, in Ross, Seventy Years of It
100 (1936). Perhaps the point concerning law and sociology can most effectively
be made by attempting to imagine President Johnson or Chief Justice Warren
reading and writing to congratulate a leader in sociological theory, such as Talcott
Parsons, on the thrust and importance of his work.
38 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 62 (Howe ed. 1953).
39Id. at 69.
40 Id. at 224.
41 Id. at 226.
42 Id. at 232.
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doubts the value of ideas until he has fixed the boundaries of
his methodology; who will give you six sentences of a dead
authority which a living journalist could express in six words;
whose conclusions look formidable until you realize that this
vagueness doesn't conceal greatness but mist. It's the great
tragedy of Pound's life that he can't see or be made to see that
only some books are to be digested. His stomach must re-
semble an ostrich's...
. . . [Pound's] own ideas are almost always clearer and
more fruitful than those he cites- [such as in] ... the cumber-
some Juggernaut he rolls along in his paper on sociological
jurisprudence. I think he believes in the natural right of every
German to be quoted.
43
Justice Holmes, more politic, did not respond to the strictures
on Pound, but merely indicated that he felt relieved by Laski's
accord on his evaluation of Small.44
Holmes' letters are also revealing in regard to Ward, and to
the general subject of reciprocal relations between law and
sociology. Holmes had read Ward, and apparently found him
provocative and stimulating. Acting on this feeling, he had gone
forth in Washington to meet Ward-"alas, stupidly late"-on hear-
ing that he was about to leave town.", Ward's response to
Holmes, despite his own training in law, included a question
asking which court it was that Holmes was associated with.46
Ward, in fact, sets in clear perspective Holmes' intellectual
hospitality by his own written appraisal of the profession he had
prepared for but never practiced because his "conscience would
not allow it:"47
There is... scarcely a doubt that if nine out of every ten
members of the legal profession were eliminated from it and
turned into some useful occupation, the ends of justice would
thereby be immensely the gainer and thousands of laborers
would be added to the industrial pursuits. But this is the class
whom the masses intrust with the framing of their laws, and as
long as the continue to do so, they must pay the penalty
of their stupidity.4
8
43 Id. at 235.
441d. at 236.45 Letter from Holmes to Ross, May 6, 1906, in Ross, Seventy Years of It 100(1936).
40 Ibid. Holmes, not to be burned twice, told Ross that he was "a judge of
the U.S. Sup. Ct."
4i Ward, Pure Sociology 488 (1903).48 Ward, the Psychic Factors in Civilization 167 (1893).
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The reaction of Holmes and that of Pound to the sociologists
and they on their part to the legal scholars who took an interest
in their ideas may be summarized as follows: first, because of the
congruence of learning and interest between members of the two
disciplines, the jurists could be and were interested in cultivating
knowledge of sociological writings; second, the sociologists, in
general, were receptive to these attentions and felt that they had
much to contribute to the resolution of legal problems and what
they saw as a somewhat static and anachronistic legal system;
third, the sociologists did not believe that there were any par-
ticular insights within the law or to be derived from legal proc-
esses or scholarship that could be germane to their work4"-their
interest in law can be said to have been rather condescending;
fourth, it appears evident that it remained for an individual such
as Pound to capitalize on this interdisciplinary congruence by
bringing back to the law and incorporating within it, with the
legitimacy of his learning and status, segments of the sociological
world which, with editing, could fill an important place in juris-
prudential thought; and last, there was present even in cos-
mopolitan legal circles considerable real and latent reluctance to
accept as meaningful and worthwhile the sociological position of
the time.
III. POUND AND SOCIOLOGICAL JUBISPRUDENCE
Pound's writings regarding sociological jurisprudence, like
many speculative declarations long in the limelight, have gone
through various stages, beginning with a vigorous and confident
pronouncement, rather zestful and polemical in nature, then
passing through a middle period of extension, formalization, and
consolidation, and finally entering a stage of defensive jousting,
pointed reiteration and reemphasis and, on occasion, mild im-
patience with criticism and with the tendency to overlook or
ignore the theory's existence. Most of the elements of this final
position lie well-hidden, surrounded by lulling displays of extra-
ordinary erudition, for Pound, as a gentleman, maintains great
dignity in the face of opposition or indifference, however trying
49 An interesting item is the report that John R. Commons, when offered a
professorship at Syracuse in the early 1890's, had planned a fifteen-year program
in "legal aspects of sociology." Because of Common's radical views, however, the
offer was subsequently withdrawn. 3 Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American
Civilization 285 (1949).
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these may be, and regularly returns to the fray, brandishing for
yet another round the tried and trusted paraphrenalia of his
sociological jurisprudence.
Pound's initial statement on sociological jurisprudence, com-
pleted in Nebraska in 1907, embodied a stirring call for research
into legal questions. Though there was much research in other
fields, Pound noted,
no one is studying seriously or scientifically how to make our
huge output of legislation effective. There are no endow-
ments for juridical research. There are no laboratories dedi-
cated to legal science whose bulletins shall make it possible
for the scholar to obtain authoritative data and for the lay
public to reach sound conclusions. No one thinks of estab-
lishing them. 0
The time was now ripe for a new approach, which Pound
denominated the "sociological tendency" and found well under-
way in Europe with the work of Stammler, Ehrlich, Gumplowicz,
Vaccaro, and Grasserie. Pound directed his polemics primarily
against law teachers, "legal monks who pass their lives in an
atmosphere of pure law," teaching "traditional pseudo-science"
unsuited for "a restless world of flesh and blood."51
To bring social reality and legal processes into closer harmony,
Pound shortly thereafter began to add jurisprudential flesh to the
bones of his initial statement, and to construct the theory of
sociological jurisprudence. It was to be a vast product of a long
creative lifetime, almost impossible to summarize adequately in
a limited amount of space.
The starting point of sociological jurisprudence was the con-
cept of social control, "the pressure upon each man brought to
bear by his fellow men in order to constrain him to do his part in
upholding civilized society and to deter him from anti-social
conduct, that is, conduct at variance with the postulates of social
order."52 Without organized social control, man's aggressive self-
assertion would prevail over his cooperative social tendency and
civilization would come to an end. Pound could only agree with
50 Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607, 608
(1907).
51 Id. at 611-2.52 Pound, Social Control Through Law 18 (1942).
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Aristotle's belief that man is inherently the fiercest of beasts.53
Law was seen as a highly specialized form of social control whose
purpose was "social engineering," the adjusting of relationships to
meet prevailing ideas of fair play. Other segments of the network
of social control-such as morals, religion, and education-interact
with law to regulate human behavior in varying combinations of
strength, depending upon the temper of different kinds of socie-
ties in different historical epochs.
A theory of interests, labelled Pound's "most important con-
tribution to legal philosophy" and "one of the significant ideas of
the century,"54 is central to sociological jurisprudence. For the
purposes of the legal system, an interest is defined as "a claim, a
want, a demand of a human being or group of human beings
which the human being or group of human beings seeks to
satisfy and of which social engineering in a civilized society
must therefore take account."55 To determine interests Pound
does not follow the lead of the social psychologist and search out
instincts, drives, or behavior tendencies, nor does he look to
sociological questionnaires or other methods of attitude measure-
ment; rather Pound relies almost exclusively on the assertions
that persons make in legal proceedings and press in legislative
proposals as true indicators of their interests vis-a'-vis the legal
system.';
Surveying these claims and rating them according to the
insistence of their demand, Pound concludes that first place must
be given to the social interest in general security against those
forms of action that threaten the social group;s7 second is the
social interest in the security of social institutions, including
domestic, religious, and political institutions; third is the general
5s Pound, supra note 19, at 332.
54 Patterson, Jurisprudence 518 (1953). Pound, of course, derived his theory
of interests from the work of the German school of Interessenjurisprudenz, and
particularly from the work of Rudolf von Jhering. Cf. The Jurisprudence of In-
terests (Schoch ed. 1948).5 5 Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 Proc. Amer. Soc. Soc'y 16, 29-30
(1921). Other and later statements of the theory are indicated in note 3. See
also, Pound, A Survey of Public Interests, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1945); Stone, The
Province and Function of Law 487-649 (1950); Patterson, Pound's Theory of
Social Interests, Interpretations of Modem Legal Philosophies 558 (Sayre ed.
1947).
56 Pound, supra note 55, at 32-3.
57 For the employment of this general proposition as an apparent justification
of apartheid, see Pollak, Roscoe Pound and Sociological jurisprudence, 47 S.A.L.J.
247, 374, 383 (1930).
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interest in morals; fourth, the social interest in the conservation
of social resources; fifth, the social interest in general progress,
involving the further development of. human powers and of
human control over nature for the satisfaction of human wants;
and sixth, "and in some ways most important of all," is the social
interest in the individual life, which includes physical, mental,
and economic activity, and especially the freedom of self-asser-
tion. 58
To supplement his survey of interests, Pound advanced a
number of jural postulates, adopting the viewpoint of Joseph
Kohler that ". . . every culture has its definite posulates of law,
and it is the duty of society from time to time, to shape the law
according to these requirements.""9 Jural postulates, things which
"in civilized society men must be able to assume," are values
found in individual cultures and as such can influence the choice
between rival interests pressing for recognition. Pound noted
five jural postulates for our time, including items such as: a) that
others will commit no intentional aggressions upon a person; and
b) that an individual may control for beneficial purposes what
he has discovered and appropriated to his own use, what he has
created by his own labor, and what he has acquired under the
existing social and economic order. 0
As a doctrine with its roots deeply planted in the social order,
and its orientation clearly directed toward sociology, sociological
jurisprudence also advanced a platform of goals. These, inter-
mingling rather indiscriminantly a number of creeds and calls,
included: a) study of the actual social effects of legal institutions,
legal precepts, and legal doctrines; b) sociological study in prep-
aration for lawmaking; c) study of means of making legal precepts
effective in action; d) study of juridical methods; e) a sociological
legal history; f) recognition of the importance of individualized
application of legal precepts; and g) in English-speaking coun-
tries, a Ministry of Justice.6
58 Pound, supra note 55, at 33-42.
59 Kohler, Philosophy of Law 4 (Albrecht trans. 1914). Cf. Elison, Kohler's
Philosophy of Law, 10 J. Pub. L. 409 (1961).
60 For a complete list see Pound, Introduction to American Law 36-43
(1919); Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence 168, 179, 183-4 (5th ed.
1943).61 Pound, supra note 1, at 513-5; Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 153
(1923); Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence 32-35 (5th ed. 1943); 1
Pound, Jurisprudence 351-358 (1959).
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Many of the preceding elements were tied together by Pound
in a much-quoted statement delivered in 1922 during the Storrs
Lectures at the Yale University Law School:
For the purpose of understanding the law of today I am
content with a picture of satisfying as much of the whole body
of human wants as we may with the least sacrifice. I am con-
tent to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social
wants-the claims and demands involved in the existence of
civilized society-by giving effect to as much as we may with
the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may be satisfied or such
claims given effect by an ordering of human conduct through
politically organized society. For present purposes I am con-
tent to see in legal history the record of a continually wider
recognition and satisfying of human wants or claims or desires
through social control; a more embracing and more effective
securing of social interests; a continually more complete and
effective elimination of waste and precluding of friction in
human enjoyment of goods of existence-in short, a con-
tinually more efficacious social engineering.62
The foregoing items, barely representing the encyclopedic
contents of Pounds' jurisprudential thought, may be enough to
indicate that the theory, consciously or unconsciously, was put
together with an eye toward its intellectual immortality. Pound
was acutely sensitive to the relationship between theoretical posi-
tions and the conditions and spirit of the times in which they
emerged; in fact, his documentations of social and historical facts
and feelings as these relate to the appearance of jurisprudential
ideas probably will come to stand as his major and most enduring
contribution to legal scholarship. Pound's historical research had
clearly shown the lethal consequences for a jurisprudential theory
of a major shift in social conditions which rendered its general
rationale obsolete, and he would not, if possible, fall into the
trap of being time-bound.
Very early, in fact a few months before the composition of
his first statement on sociological jurisprudence, Pound has
rhetorically conveyed to Justice Holmes an important insight
concerning the manner in which ideas come to be catalogued in
intellectual inventories and to be associated with some perma-
nence with particular men. "Am I not right," he asked Holmes,
62 Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 98-99 (1922).
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"in thinking that this insistence on one point of view as the unun
necessarium in legal science is what makes a school?" 3 The
success of Pound's own efforts illustrate the value of his insight.
Drawing freely on the works of others Pound was able to create
the paradox of eclectic uniqueness through adroit recombination
of ingredients, the use of an original label, and the insistence on
acceptance of the whole package as a new school of legal thought.
Pound was well aware of the need of jurisprudential doctrine
to come to grips with the "lasting and irrefutable truth" 4 that it
must deal directly with "the perennial problem of preserving
stability and admitting of change."' 5 The longevity of Pound's
sociological jurisprudence, particularly in a period of strikingly
rapid social change, testified to careful attention to object lessons
concerning the historical fate of inflexible positions. Nonetheless,
Pound's theory, with all its resiliency and with its great hos-
pitality to shifts in the social fabric was to prove, almost by
definition, too pliant and too general for empirical research es-
sential to its continued growth, however effective and telling the
theory became as a pedagogical weapon. Goitein's apt judgment,
harsh by its very kindness, seems to make the point well:
Sociological jurisprudence, he writes, "may well brave ridicule
... indeed for its compelling plea for social enlightenment among
lawyers it will outlast many a fashion." 6
IV. ESTRANGE MNT BETwEEN SocIoLoGy AND LAW
By tying the development of sociological jurisprudence to the
progress of sociology, Pound built into his theory a permanent
impermanence. At the same time, however, the theory was placed
beyond the ability of Pound himself and, apparently, of his fol-
lowers to maintain the necessary liason with scholarship in soci-
ology and to reckon with the disinclination of sociologists to
provide the theory with intellectual nourishment.
In a revealing statement in 1927, Pound clearly indicated the
interdependence of sociology and sociological jurisprudence,
63 Letter from Pound to Holmes, April 15, 1907, in Sayre, the Life of Roscoe
Pound 267 (1948).
64 Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence 218 (1962).
65Pound, An Lntroduction to the Philosophy of Law 80 (1922); Pound,
Interpretations of Legal History 1 (1923). Cardozo employed this principle as a
basic motif in The Growth of the Law (1924).06 Goitein, Jurisprudence, 13 Encyc. Brit. 196, 198 (1963).
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pointing out that "in the past fifty years the development of
sociological jurisprudence has been effected profoundly by soci-
ology,"6 7 and then tracing the implications of this intertwined
condition:
As [sociological jurisprudence] has followed the develop-
ment of sociology, and so has gone somewhat rapidly through
the changes that have marked the growth of that science,
there are those who assume that they may lay hold of some
tentative doctrine of a past stage and insist that sociological
jurists must adhere thereto for all time. Thus, because the
first type of sociologist regarded legal institutions and legal
doctrines as products of an inexorable mechanism of social
forces, excluding all possibility of effective creative activity,
it is often assumed without warrant that such must be the
position of the sociological jurist of to-day. Others assume
that because at one time sociology went through a descriptive
stage, sociological jurisprudence must therefore be a mere
gathering of data as to the legal institutions of primitive
peoples. Other critics assume that the ethnological and bio-
logical interpretations of legal history, which went along with
the biological sociology, must inevitably be accepted by the
sociological jurist forever after. These things are as much in
the past of sociological jurisprudence as they are in sociology.
The charatceristic marks of the sociological jurists of the
present are that they study law as a phase of social control
and seek to understand its place in the whole scheme of social
order; that they regard the working of law rather than its
abstract content; that they think of law as a social institution
which may be improved by intelligent human effort and hold
it the duty of jurists to discover the means of furthering and
directing that effort; and that they lay stress upon the social
purposes which law subserves rather than upon theories of
sanction. 68
Quite meaningfully, Pound concluded his essay with the terse
observation that "while sociology has done much for juris-
prudence, jurisprudence has been utilized less in sociology than
its possibilities warrant." 9 This, in fact, was clear understatement
for the bridge between sociological jurisprudence and sociology,
07 Pound, Sociology and Law, The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations
319, 324 (Ogbum & Goldenweiser ed. 1927).
0s Id. at 325.
69 Ibid. Note also this comment on sociological jurisprudence: "[While it is
undoubtedly a school of jurisprudence it is hardly a school of sociology." Lepaulle,
The Function of Comparative Law, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 839 (1922).
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never too stable, had collapsed almost totally as sociology turned
from the Ward-Ross-Small type of speculative, yet rather sys-
tematic form of social analysis, 70 toward greater methodoligical
precision, toward research stressing informal groups rather than
institutional patterns, and toward ethical neutrality and the
avoidance of value-laden issues.7 1 Evidence of this estrangement
between law and sociology appears on all sides during the period
between 1920 and the Second World War, and continues to be
prominent today.
The early rationale of sociology, arising from "that general
groping for social betterment produced by the misery that came
in the wake of the industrial revolution and the factory system"7
2
came to be caricatured by later sociologists as a preoccupation
with "sex, sin, and sewage."73 Sociologists began to value the
work of persons whom, as Riesman puts it, "with no philosophical
training, consume their time affixing exact degrees of significance
to insignificant correlations and never get around to discovering
anything new about society."74
By 1939, Ward's biographer could plaintively label him "A
Buried Caesar"75 and note that "most American teachers of
sociology will smile tolerantly at the mention of his name as one
7 0 The sociology before their time and in lesser circles has been aptly
described by Ross as "a turgid mass of stale metaphysics, dark sayings, random
historical allusions, and mawkish ethical raptures." Book Review, 12 Educ. Rev.
88, 92 (1896).
71 See Mills, The Sociological Imagination (1959).72 Barnes, Development of Sociology, Contemporary Social Theory 3 (Barnes
ed. 1940).73 Becker, Anthropology and Sociology, For a Science of Social Man 102, 145
(Gillin ed. 1954).
74 Riesman, Thorstein Veblen 48 (1953). Cf. Lynd, Knowledge for What?
183 (1946): "Research without an actively selected point of view becomes the
ditty bag of an idiot, filled with bits of pebbles, straws, feathers and other random
hoardings." Note contra, Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv.
L. Rev. 443, 444 (1899): "I somewhat sympathize with the Cambridge mathe-
matician's praise of his theorem, 'The best of it all is that it can never by any
possibility be made of the slightest use to anybody for anything."
%iesran has spoken of the misunderstanding that can result when lawyers,
still presuming the social welfare motif in sociology, approach sociologists for
assistance:
[W]hen a law professor comes to a sociolo because he is worried
about the unequal distribution of justice, an regards legal aid work as
a drop in the bucket, the latter's preoccupation with methodology and
lack of reformist concern may surprise him and send him back to his own
devices.
Piesman, Law and Sociology, Law and Sociology 12, 80-1 (Evan ed. 1962).
Note: Lloyd, Introduction of Jurisprudence 190 (1960): ". . . the sociological
creed is essentially an optimistic on which puts its faith in human perfectibility,
especially in social relations."
75 Chugerman, Lester F. Ward: the American Aristotle 64 (1939).
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who lived in the dim nineties and has been left far behind."76
"As far as American sociology was concerned," another writer
noted, "Ward was dead long before he died."77 Of Small it was
said that his "permanent influence upon sociology through his
writings will ultimately prove slight and ephemeral as compared
with the impress of his personality and personal activities upon
the development of the sociological movement."78 It was un-
likely, it was said of the third of the American sociologists who
had provided focus for sociological jurisprudence, that Ross'
"system as such will ever have a great deal of importance for
formal social theory."79 During the following half century, only a
handful of texts supplementing Ross' original work on social
control were published, and these were generally unsophisticated
in their approach to law, retrogressing rather than advancing
from Ross' initial position. Perhaps somewhat stronger than most,
the following quotation from one such text is nonetheless not
atypical:
Probably no profession in America is so much emerged
[sic] in tradition as is the legal profession. To date, it has had
no forward look, no serious research interests, and had made
no serious effort to relate the practices of law to problems of
human welfare and human adjustment. For the most part, the
law has been punitive in its attitude and involved only with
questions of interpreting statutes, not with questions of human
relationships as such. 0
The only significant gestures from sociology toward law dur-
ing this period appeared in two works in the field of "sociology of
law."81 These treatises were products of European-trained juris-
prudents and their sociology was too speculative to gain recogni-
tion in America and their jurisprudence too remote from Pound's
to make much impress there. Timasheff in 1938 had pronounced
his work as part of "the new science called the sociology of law"
76 Id. at 70.
77 Burnham, Lester Frank Ward in American Thought 10 (1956).78 Barnes, supra note 35, at 788.
79 Kolb, supra note 12, at 831. See also Foreword, Social Control and
Foundations of Sociology (Borgatta & Meyer ed., 1959); Hollingshead, The Con-
cept of Social Control, 6 Amer. Soc. Rev. 217 (1941).
80 Landis, Social Control 444-5 (rev. ed. 1956). See also Lapiere, A Theory
of Social Control 316, 318-9 (1954).
8 1 Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law (1939); Gurvitch,
Sociology of Law (1942). Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of
Law (Moll trans. 1936) does not figure in this development, having originally
been published in 1913.
KENTUCKY LAW JoU.NAL
whose object was "the determination and the coordination of
human behavior in society by the existence of legal norms" and
through the use of "causal-functional investigation." 2 But two
decades after his original statement, Timasheff was willing to
concede that "interaction between general sociology and the
sociology of law has been superficial" and he anticipated that it
would remain so until sociology of law developed "something
tangible and sufficiently verified to offer for incorporation into
the central core of sociological theory."83
Pound took considerable pains with the appearance of these
European works to spell out the relationship between sociology
of law and sociological jurisprudence and to relegate the former
to its own non-preemptive niche. "Sociology of law is not socio-
logical jurisprudence," Pound stressed, and it could not "assume
to dispense with jurisprudence' though it might serve as a critic,
along with the philosophy of law, and might help to correct the
specialized generalizations of sociological jurisprudence. But
sociological jurisprudence had a field and a mission to which
neither sociology nor philosophy of law was "wholly adequate,
important as each is to the jurist who would be assured of a wide
knowledge of his subject."
14
The views of Pound concerning the presumptions of sociology
of law and the neglect by American sociology of legal matters
were put forward quite succinctly in a 1943 article.85 Pound
indicates that there had been hostility among common-law law-
yers toward sociology as it developed and gained recognition in
America, though he supports this observation with citations to
writings obviously hostile not primarily to "that science which
deals with social man and is awkwardly termed 'sociology,"' 86 but
rather to the importation of sociology, seen as a form of German-
bred socialism, into legal matters.8 7 Pound, with apparent pique,
also quotes Gurvitch's bland assumption that sociologists and
82 Timasheff, op. cit. supra note 81, at 30.8
3Timasheff, Growth and Scope of Sociology of Law, Modem Sociological
Theory in Continuity and Change 424 (Becker & Boskoff ed. 1957).84 Pound, Preface, Gurvitch, Sociology of Law xv (1942).85 Pound, Sociology of Law and Sociological jurisprudence, 5 U. Toronto
L.J. 1 (1948).86 Fowler, The New Philosophies of Law, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 727 (1914).
87 Ibid. Also Fowler, The Future of the Common Law, 18 Colum. L. Rev.
595 (1918). Note Fowler's remark:
Most 'jurists' hate law as an art and love only its speculative side. The
(Continued on next page)
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jurists, each having hollowed out his respective gallery, have
finally come together in (Gurvitch's) sociology of law,88 and then
attempts to rebut the charge that sociological jurisprudence has
an unscientific tendency to take up concrete problems and pro-
nounce judgments of value. Perhaps the best answer to this,
Pound retorts, barely providing an answer at all, is that made by
Amos; "[Sociological jurisprudence] cuts ice."89 Sociological juris-
prudence must wrestle with things such as values, says Pound,
"even ff sociology of law, as a theoretical science, must not."90
Pound also notes his continuing allegiance to the brand of
sociology now in disfavor, and by his choice of verbs indicates
his awareness of its status: "American sociology . . . has been
devoted largely to social problems and to extensive and intensive
picturing of contemporary social conditions. ... It was in con-
nexion with sociology of this type that American sociological juris-
prudence arose."91 Finally, Pound reiterates the need, still exist-
ing, to accomplish the goals set forth forty years before as the
program of sociological jurisprudence:
The task laid down in the programme of American socio-
logical jurisprudence is always at hand to be done. If socio-
logy on one side, and jurisprudence on the other, must be so
narrowly limited as to exclude it, then, if we cannot redefine
we shall have to claim the goodwill of the two names as the
exponents of sociology of law are claiming the goodwill of
the name "law."
92
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
true man of law, the plain, practicing, busy useful lawyer, has little time
for philosophical tangles; he is otherwise engaged as a champion in the
actual battles of legal life, avenging the wrong and injured, and defend-
ing the accused.
Id. at 603.
88 Gurvitch, op. cit. supra note 81, at 3.
8 9 Pound, supra note 85, at 20. The quote is from Amos, Roscoe Pound,
Modem Theories of Law 86, 90 (Jennings ed. 1933). Sir Maurice, however,
was not above a little needling of his own, such as when he indicates that
sociological jurisprudence must be "translated into less repellant language." Id. at
101.
90 Pound, supra note 85, at 20.
91 Id. at 9.
92 Id. at 5. Note also:
What we require is not a philosophy of law that seeks to force law into
the bed of Procrustes of its system, nor a sociology of law that runs to
methodology and seeks to justify a science of society by showing that it
has its own special method by which then all the phenomena of social
life are to be tried, but a sociology that knows how to use philosophy
and a sociological jurisprudence that knows how to use social philosophy
and a philosophical sociology.
Pound, Social Control Through Law 7 (1942).
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V. SocIoLoGY AND LAW: GROWING RAPPROCHEmENT
The tendency of sociology to return to matters of immediate
social concern seemed to take form soon after the conclusion of
the Second World War. Louis Wirth, surveying sociological
developments from 1895 to 1947, indicated the shift:
In recent years sociology seems to have begun to move
into a phase closely resembling the period of initial enthusiasm
for sociology in America. This phase is marked by a return
to the original interest of sociologists in the actual problems
of man in society. The presently emerging orientation of
sociology differs from that of a generation ago, however, in
several important respects; in Small's day the passion for solv-
ing the practical problems of society was supported and sus-
tained by little more than faith that sociology could discover
a scientific foundation for ethics and social policies and was
guided in its investigations largely by unproved but intuitively
plausible broad philosophical notions concerning human na-
ture, the social order and social dynamics.
The contemporary return of sociology to the original in-
terest of its intellectual progenitors in contrast is distinguished
by more tempered expectations .... Rather than aspiring to
the role of value-setter, the contemporary sociologist is in-
creasingly sensitive to the fact that science, or at least science
alone, cannot set values.93
Only a few of the indications of the rapprochement between
law and sociology can be noted in the remaining space; perhaps
the most obvious have been two recent volumes, fostered pri-
marily by sociologists, and dealing with areas of mutual concern
to their discipline and the law.94 Articles in both books, as well
as in other recent publications, take up a number of basic issues
of cooperative research and spell out with some precision unre-
solved questions, allowing for their further examination by
scholars in either discipline. Selznick, for instance, maintains
that sociology will best help legal research by meticulously "tend-
ing its own garden,"95 while Strodtbeck takes an opposing posi-
93 Quoted in Bramson, the Political Content of Sociology 93-4 (1961).
94Law and Sociology (Evan ed. 1962); F. J. Davis, Society & the Law
(1962).
95 Selznick, The Sociology of Law, Sociology Today 115, 117 (Merton ed.
1959).
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tion: By concentrating on real legal issues, he insists, sociologists
will be forced to sharpen their analytical tools to a finer edge.,
Joint research efforts by sociologists and lawyers remain sparse
enough to be catalogued briefly by writers seeking to indicate
such endeavors;97 their existence alone, however, betokens an
obvious trend, even though, as it has been aptly expressed, the
relationship between law and sociology "is still limited to the
self-chosen initiates, and has not become part of the routine kit
of working tools of either profession.""' Perhaps the most sig-
nificant development appears in the growing demand that the
social sciences concentrate greater attention on questions of
values. It is being urged that the stress on cultural relativism,
long fashionable in sociology, is itself the outcome of a value
commitment, probably based on humanistic and pedagogical con-
siderations, that "normative systems" represent vital and as-
certainable units of sociological investigation, and that "a vigor-
ous research program, devoted to the formulation and testing of
natural law principles" [i.e., items showing "unity in diversity"]
"might do much to advance both the cause of justice and soci-
ological truth."99
Abandonment of the harbor of methodological security comes
hard, however, and the anticipated loss of "pure" scientific
objectivity raises certain yearnings in research sociologists set-
ting out on the journey into a value-laden world. These doubts,
expressed with particular sensitivity and awareness by a younger
sociologist, indicate both the direction in which sociological
thinking and the resistance it must overcome before traveling
comfortably along that path:
... The relation of scholarship to political involvement is
very complex. In the end they don't mix well.., but I believe
0
06 Strodtbeck, Social Process, the Law and Jury Functioning, Law and Soci-
ology, op. cit. supra note 94, at 144, 163. Strodtbeck receives support from
Biesman who suggests that an examination of research done in response to "the
track of the discipline" shows no more seminal character than research done in
"quest of an answer to an extra-academic problem." Riesman, supra note 74, at 41.
97 See Geis, Sociology and Crime, Sociology of Crime 7, 25 (Roucek ed.
1961); Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Ann. Rpt., Center for the Study of Law & Society(1962).9s Blumrosen, Legal Process and Labor Law, Law & Sociology, op. cit. supra
note 94, at 185-6.
09 Selznick, Sociology & Natural Law, 6 Natural L. Forum 84, 108 (1961).
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in mixing them anyway. Personally, I prefer the half-success-
ful scholar-politician to the serenely and completely successful
half-man. That is why I have a stubborn, ineradicable ad-
miration for [C. Wright] Mills, despite his shortcomings
[as a scientist] .... 100
The meaning of the reconsideration by sociologists of legal
matters for the future of sociological jurisprudence is far from
clear. Sociologists to date have paid virtually no attention to
Pound's doctrine, either in terms of rejecting it, refining it for
their purposes, or supplementing it with sociological material of
more recent vintage. Pound himself did not keep the theory
abreast of sociological developments, perhaps, as indicated, be-
cause such work was not relevant to his position. 1' 1
If sociology were to devote attention to sociological juris-
prudence as a doctrine from which to derive empirical leads, then
it might attempt to operationalize segments of Pound's theory;
for instance, by employing content analysis techniques to deter-
mine the interplay of interests as these appear in appellate
briefs or appellate decisions. Jural postulates might be measured
against the expressed preferences of samples of persons, in terms
of real or simulated legal conflicts. While such work could be
profitable, it seems likely that sociological jurisprudence will
continue to be found wanting as a springboard for sociological
investigations into the legal system. For scholars approaching
sociological jurisprudence from a legal base, it appears that it can
be taken only so far without carrying into the realm of sociology
or other branches of the social sciences. Rliesman's judgment
seems pertinent here:
The early advocates of sociological jurisprudence were unduly
sanguine . . .Many of them hoped to storm the fortress of
law without extensive empirical work but with what now
appear as semantic and epistemological slogans. The effect
of these slogans was at first stimulating, especially when they
were felt to be part of a general movement toward realism
and debunking vis-A-vis American institutions. Now that the
100 Berger, Letter, N.Y. Times Book Rev., June 2, 1963, p. 25, col. 3. See also
Berger, Adolescence and Beyond, 10 Social Problems 394 (1968).
101 It is interesting that Pound has also been accused of being inattentive to
later legal writers, "many of whom were writing while Pound was still in powerful
spate." Llewellyn, Jurisprudence 496 (1962).
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tasks loom in their true magnitude, I hope that scholars will
nonetheless persevere.
0 2
If scholars do persevere-both legal and sociological scholars
-as it seems likely they will, then the prediction of Ziesel also
appears to be accurate, that "the main thrust of sociological in-
quiry into the law, in this country at least, will follow the nar-
rower if safer road of empirical research, rather than broad
speculative tradition, although ultimately the two should link
up."'10 3 If this is true, and it is suggested that it is likely, then it
seems equally reasonable to suppose that sociological jurispru-
dence itself will disappear as a distinguishable entity, except for
historical purposes, and that a new amalgamation of sociology
and related sciences with law, perhaps labelled functional juris-
prudence in law, 04 and the sociology of law in sociology, will
bring together anew the insights and research findings achieved
and to be achieved by work in the two disciplines.
102 Riesman, supra note 74, at 15.
1
03 Ziesel, Social Research on the Law, Law & Sociology, op. cit. supra note
94, at 124, 126.
104 The term is suggested in Paton, A Text-Book of Jurisprudence 17 (2d ed.
1951), and Paton, Pound and Contemporary Juristic Thought, 22 Can. B. Rev.
479, 483 (1944).
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